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1. Introduction. The aim and structure of the work 
 
 
Kazutaka Inamura’s book, the development of a PhD thesis, examines the 
political philosophy of Aristotle from a double perspective. One of them, which we could 
name ‘historical’, concerns the insights the philosopher provides on political problems 
such as the exercise of authority, civic virtue and friendship, economic arrangements, and 
so forth. The other perspective is more properly speaking ‘philosophical’, and consists in 
the attempt to distinguish Aristotle’s integral philosophy from the selective vindication of 
Aristotelianism by some influential contemporary thinkers - in particular, the author has 
in mind defenders of communitarianism, civic republicans, and the theorists attached to 
the capabilities approach. Inamura contends that “the original offers more useful insights 
into the problems of political philosophy than these ‘Aristotelian’ theories do” (p.1) and 
that “although each of the three approaches I have identified captures some of the 
characteristics of Aristotle’s political thought, they do not fully illuminate his interesting 
vision of politics” (p. 25). The author emphasizes the aristocratic penchant of Aristotle (a 
characteristic that no one who studies his Ethics can reasonably deny), as well as the 
importance of reciprocity in civic relations as two neglected aspects of his political 
philosophy through which one can build a constructive criticism of modern Aristotelians. 
Despite their indebtedness to Aristotle, such authors have not made the best use of his 
arguments concerning politics.  
The emphasis on aristocracy and reciprocity accounts for the organization of the 
chapters in the book: after reading the general outlines of the work in chapter one, we 
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meet the aristocratic conception Aristotle has of a good life and a good polis in chapter 
two. In chapter three we see this conception playing an important role in his criticism of 
democracy and his defense of a mixed constitution comprising aristocratic elements (= 
the exercise of political office by the virtuous citizens) and democratic ones (= the 
wisdom of the multitude in jurisdiction and assessment). Reciprocity is the main subject 
in chapters 4, 5 and 6. It is the kernel of the democratic aspect of Aristotle’s political 
philosophy – taking turns in jurisdiction and the assessment of political office, learning 
thereby both to rule and to be ruled, the multitude obtains a civic improvement of their 
virtues with the help of laws the universality of which disciplines their particular desires 
(chapter 4), and develops as well a communal friendship based on shared interests 
(chapter 5). Utility and virtue unite in chapter 6, where reciprocity in the political 
economy is the subject: it is an exercise of the virtue of justice (= commercial exchanges) 
and keeps citizens united to the extent that they need one another.     
 
2. Inamura on the Political Philosophy of Aristotle 
 
The study of Aristotle’s aristocratic way of thinking in chapter II starts with the 
famously ambiguous remark in the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, which affirms 
that the goodness of the polis is greater, more complete, finer and more divine than the 
goodness inhering in an individual man, but still fundamentally the same goodness. Since 
the same treatise teaches its audience that individual goodness is the virtuous life, it 
follows that the goodness of the polis must be some sort of virtuous activity. Therefore, 
the aristocratic conception characteristic of the moral philosophy of Aristotle also belongs 
to his political philosophy. However, it is by no means clear in which way individual and 
civic goodness is the same. Is this a whole-part relation, i.e., a good polis is composed of 
citizens who are themselves good men? Or is the goodness of a polis holistic instead, i.e., 
a goodness inhering in it as a whole entity, and thus independent of the qualities of each 
citizen particularly considered?   
In order to attempt an answer to these difficulties, the author emphasizes that, in 
book III of the Politics, virtue itself instead of freedom or wealth is presented as the best 
criterion for the allotment of public office among citizens. Inamura defends that in the 
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passage 1280b40-81a8 (III.9) we have Aristotle’s own conception of what is the purpose 
of political governance, namely, the happy life or the exercise of noble actions. It is, thus, 
the capacity of a citizen for acting virtuously that should determine the extent of his share 
in political authority. So, this is the aristocratic commitment of Aristotle – he answers in 
this passage the question left unanswered in NE V. 3 concerning the proper ‘merit’ (axia) 
for the distribution of power. To the extent that virtue is the criterion for the exercise of 
political authority, we understand one aspect of that obscure relation between the 
goodness of the polis and the goodness of the individual: in a sense, it is a whole-part 
relation, for even though a good polis is not necessarily composed only by virtuous 
citizens, its governing body must be composed by virtuous people.      
But the nature of aristocracy itself, that is, being a government of the few 
(virtuous) with a view to the good of the polis as a whole (Pol. III. 7), implies that 
government by the virtuous citizens is the best form of government because it is the best 
way to promote the good lives of all citizens. In this way, aristocratic governance makes 
the polis as a whole good, a goodness that is holistic in nature. By pointing out the 
relation between the overall goodness of citizens and the virtue of the minority holding 
political authority, Inamura shows - against the criticism of Martha Nussbaum - that 
Aristotle builds a coherent picture of the goodness of the polis. The picture is complex 
enough to encompass a whole-part aspect corresponding to the virtue of the governing 
body as well as a holistic aspect corresponding to the improvement of the lives of 
everyone by the virtuous governing body. 
The examination of the holistic aspect of the polis goodness gives rise to the other 
main point in chapter two, namely, the purpose of the analogy between individual and 
polis. For Inamura, the purpose of Aristotle is to defend a moderate holistic conception of 
the good polis in which its whole structure is an object of moral evaluation, without 
supposing therewith that the individual good of citizens is simply irrelevant. In order to 
prove this point, the author resorts to three arguments in book VII of the Politics - they 
indicate that polis goodness is conceived by Aristotle in accordance with individual 
goodness. First, Pol. VII. 1 affirms that a happy polis does not simply possess certain 
goods, but also does noble things, just like a happy man is someone who is virtuous and 
also possess the external goods enabling him to act virtuously. Hence, the polis as an 
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entity must possess virtue and practical wisdom in order to be happy. Second, the curious 
remark about contemplation being some sort of action in VII.3 extends to the polis the 
individual’s ability to “act” by himself (i.e., to philosophize). The contemplative activity 
of the polis consists in promoting the good interaction of its own inhabitants instead of 
promoting relations – friendly or unfriendly – with other poleis. Relations between poleis 
would thus be analogous to human actions in the strict sense, which require, according to 
EN X.7, other people towards whom I act. Finally, the arguments about the proper size 
for a polis are based on the notion that, just like an individual man, the polis is endowed 
with its own task (ergon).            
Inamura traces several criticisms by Aristotle of existing constitutions to his 
moderate holistic conception of the virtue of a polis. For instance, the fact that people 
engage in war for the sake of peace shows that the peaceful interaction of citizens rather 
than war is the true aim of a polis. Moreover, the very possibility of a polis living by 
itself in peace, without engaging in wars against rivals, shows that war cannot be the task 
of poleis. Besides, since war compels people to be just or temperate while it is more 
difficult to possess those virtues during peace, it follows that bringing about a polis life 
that is both peaceful and virtuous ought to be the main concern of the legislators. They 
ought to educate citizens for a non-warlike life distinguished by justice, temperance and 
philosophy. In this way, the laws of Sparta (and other poleis), aiming at the conquest and 
enslavement of rivals, is harshly criticized. By relating Aristotle’s holistic notion of a 
good polis to his criticism of the Spartan constitution, Inamura successfully establishes 
the mistake of the interpretation according to which the superiority of the polis’s good in 
relation to the individual good (affirmed in the beginning of the NE) implies that the 
individual good ought to be sacrificed to the good of the polis. If that was the case, Sparta 
could not be criticized for the warlike way of life it imposes on its citizens. Therefore, the 
extreme holistic nature of polis goodness that Karl Popper attributes to many 
philosophers cannot be correctly attributed to Aristotle.    
Chapter three presents Aristotle’s theory of the mixed constitution as the blueprint 
for a practically workable regime comprising elements of aristocracy, democracy and 
monarchy. The famous argument about the wisdom of the multitude is then interpreted by 
the author as a democratic addition to aristocratic government. This position is consistent 
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with the rejection of democracy in the strict sense, i.e., rule based on the mere status of 
freeborn, as a deviant form of constitution.  
Examining the typology of constitutions in the Politics, based on actual power-
relations, Inamura contends that in Aristotle’s political theory there is nothing like the 
modern notion of a constitution originating in the will of the people. Instead, we find that 
each constitution is based on the supremacy (to kyrion) of a certain kind of people, 
namely, those who actually govern the polis. That explains Aristotle’s concern with 
wealth and poverty, the military organization of the polis, the kinds of free people who 
participate in office, etc. In this context, democracy meant democratic government, that 
is, free people dealing with public affairs. It bears no relation to the notion of democratic 
sovereignty characteristic of modern democracy, that is, people being allowed to choose 
those who will deal with public affairs in their place. In the Politics, election is rather an 
oligarchic or aristocratic way of choosing public officials, whereas the democratic way is 
drawing lots.  
Therefore, modern democracy, according to Aristotle’s typology, ought to be seen 
as some form of mixed constitution, for it comprises additional elements besides those of 
pure democracy. Inamura then describes the two varieties of mixed constitution for 
Aristotle. First, there is ‘polity’, the form of mixed constitution that is intermediary 
between democracy and oligarchy. It comes into being either by incorporating laws of 
both democratic and oligarchic nature, or by ascribing actual power to hoplites, who are 
not so wealthy as the cavalrymen nor so poor as the light-armed soldiers or rowers in 
warships. Second, there is another mixed constitution that comprises elements of 
aristocracy and monarchy in addition to those of democracy and oligarchy. Resorting to 
some passages, 1294a19-25 in particular, Inamura defends that this most complete form 
of mixed constitution, where political authority is distributed according to virtue, wealth 
and freedom, is indeed a form of aristocracy rather than a form of polity, for the highest 
offices are here ascribed to virtuous citizens. And it is this aristocratic mixed constitution 
that most closely resembles modern democracies.  
In accordance with the emphasis put on aristocracy, the interpretation of the 
“wisdom of the multitude” argument in Pol. III. 11 by Inamura diverges from Jeremy 
Waldron’s view that this argument is a defense of deliberative democracy. It is not the 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.11, n.2. p. 158-172, 2016. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v11i2p158-172 
162
deliberative excellence of the multitude that justifies its inclusion in the political process, 
for such excellence would be the foundation of deliberative democracy and not of a 
mixed constitution. The multitude excels rather by cumulating a multiplicity of 
perceptive faculties for recognizing particular situations. According to 1281b34-38, once 
the multitude comes together, it aggregates “enough perception” (hikanen aisthesin) to 
act to the best advantage of the polis. The author contextualizes this remark in Aristotle’s 
theory of practical wisdom as presented in NE VI: practical wisdom being concerned with 
the perception of particulars, the variety of perceptions in the united multitude contributes 
significantly to good action, in spite of the imperfections of each member of the multitude 
with regard both to virtue and to practical wisdom. The advantage resulting from 
combining diverse perceptions would be the best explanation for the obscure remark of 
Aristotle in 1281a42-b10 to the effect that each member of the multitude “has a part of 
virtue and practical wisdom”, something difficult to reconcile with his thesis about the 
necessary connection between all virtues in the character of the practically wise man.  
This interpretation of the wisdom of the multitude is compatible with the 
aristocratic penchant that the author sees in Aristotle’s mixed constitution: so, while it is 
best to let lawmaking to the virtuous minority, who will enact the best laws in exercising 
their practical wisdom, the people at large is able to perceive the particular situations 
which correspond to those laws. By the same token, it is better to ascribe administrative 
offices to people who possess knowledge or skill, but to leave the assessment of the 
exercise of such functions to the multitude in the assembly. In this way, the aristocratic 
commitment of Aristotle is reconciled with the necessity to include in the political 
process the non-virtuous majority of wealthy and simply free-born people.  
Those practical issues connect Aristotle’s work to the end of chapter three, where 
we find a short and somewhat confusing sub-chapter about the influence of the Greek 
Philosopher over modern political thinkers like Montesquieu and J.S. Mill. The author 
proposes that the theory of mixed constitution discussed in Pol. III influences 
Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of powers and Mill’s thoughts about 
government, lamenting that contemporary discussions of democracy tend to neglect such 
an important theoretical heritage. Needless to say, such intricate and complex questions 
cannot be really discussed in 8 pages.  
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Complementing the study of the aristocratic commitment of Aristotle, chapters 4, 
5 and 6 examine three conceptions belonging to his political philosophy that the author 
believes to represent its democratic aspect: civic virtue, civic friendship and commutative 
justice. The aggregate of these notions would be “the conceptual framework Aristotle 
uses to analyze and cultivate the ideal of equality among citizens” (p. 106). The kernel of 
this conceptual framework is reciprocal equality, the second guiding notion of Inamura’s 
thesis (besides the aristocratic commitment). By taking turns in the exercise of political 
authority, that is, governing and being governed, citizens learn how to care about the 
good of their equals, developing thereby civic virtues and civic relations of friendship.   
 Civic virtue, the subject matter of chapter 4, is described as encompassing both 
the capacity for being actively engaged in politics and the passive capacity for being 
governed. Many interpreters emphasize the first capacity while tending to neglect the last 
one. Inamura, however, points to Aristotle’s remark that equality between citizens does 
require that people take turns in political authority, as well as to the educational value the 
philosopher ascribes to being governed as a way of learning how to govern. Civic virtue 
is, then, an offshoot of reciprocal equality: goodness in acting is directly related to 
understanding how it is to be acted upon. Unlike despotic rule, in which the master 
permanently rules the slave with a view to his own benefit, political rule is exercised with 
a view to the benefit of ruler and ruled. Therefore, the experience of being ruled by other 
citizens will provide one with insights about how to consider the benefit of the ruled 
when it comes for himself the occasion of ruling others.  
In order to assess the importance of political activity for the moral development of 
citizens, the author resorts to passages in Pol. I about the different degrees of virtue and 
rationality between the members of the household and to the famous passage in Pol. III 
about the government of laws. Ordinary citizens, says Aristotle, need the constraints of 
laws to act with full rationality, for only the generality of laws detaches them from their 
peculiar desires. Inamura suggests that reciprocal governance, taking turns in jurisdiction 
and public deliberation, is thereby an essential element of the moral education of citizens 
through the laws. There is a contrast here with the predicament of the patriarch who rules 
a family: he rules wife, offspring and slaves according to nothing but his own 
deliberation, without the laws to counterbalance the influence of his own desires. For the 
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author, a consequence of the absence of laws in the domestic association is that most 
patriarchs become virtuous men only in the polis, and not in the household. This is 
undoubtedly an interesting conception of the goodness ordinary men are able to achieve 
according to Aristotelian ethics, but it does not fit smoothly with the philosopher’s 
remarks in 1129b25-1130a8 and 1134b8-18 about how much easier it is to act virtuously 
in general and justly in particular towards family members than it is to do so towards 
strangers1.    
The study of civic friendship in chapter 5 puts the author at odds with two 
opposing views about the importance of this kind of friendship for Aristotle’s political 
philosophy. One (J. Cooper) puts great emphasis on civic friendship as a link of goodwill 
between fellow-citizens, arguing that such a situation is possible because civic friendship 
does not require the intimacy that is typical of private friendship. The opposing view (J. 
Annas), in its turn, downplays civic friendship as a relevant notion in the Politics. It states 
that friendship necessarily requires intimacy and not simply goodwill, and it is impossible 
that such close relations hold between large numbers of fellow-citizens.     
In order to avoid either ascribing to civic friendship the intimate nature of virtue-
friendship or reducing it to goodwill, the author proposes that Aristotle tends to see it as a 
sort of advantage-friendship. Several passages in the NE and the Eudemian Ethics support 
the thesis. According to EE 7.10, for example, civic friendship results from the lack of 
self-sufficiency of people, who unite with a view to mutual help through their different 
abilities. The exchanges of goods, for example, would be an activity in which civic 
friendship flourishes. Therefore, civic friendship goes beyond goodwill: it requires 
relationships of reciprocity between people who are mutually aware of their relation. 
Another passage, NE 9. 6, defines “concord” (homonoia) as civic friendship, and affirms 
that it is the agreement concerning matters of common interest, like the right way to 
choose public officials or the expediency of an alliance with Sparta. Agreement on such 
issues is reached through the alternate exercise of political office, and so the author 
defends that citizens exercising political authority in turns, caring each one about the 
1 Compare Inamura’s thesis with Jackson, 1879, p. 71, Stewart, 1892, p. 393-9 and p.489-91 as 
well as Gauthier & Jolif, 2002, pp. 342 and 389-91.  
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interests he shares with his fellow citizens, develop a reciprocal relation in which civic 
friendship flourishes.  
There seems to be something uneven between the two faculties Inamura ascribes 
to reciprocal equality - originating civic virtue, on the one hand, and civic friendship, on 
the other. I believe the crux of the difficulty lies in the fact that the alternate exercise of 
office does not provide necessarily a context for reciprocal relationships, since people 
who are entirely unknown to each other may very well take turns in the exercise of 
political authority. That is, they share the common predicament of being fellow citizens, 
but that is not a relationship between them. Although this does not seem to be a problem 
for the development of civic virtue (according to the explanation of it by Inamura), it 
does seem an obstacle to the development of civic friendship: for utility-friendship is a 
relationship, even if not an intimate one. In this sense, commercial exchange, unlike 
reciprocal governance, does indeed engage the exchanging parties in a mutually aware 
relation to one another. So, given the nature of political activity, it seems to me that civic 
friendship could indeed be reduced to a goodwill directed at people we may even not 
know.  
The last chapter of the book deals with Aristotle’s theories of political economy, 
another domain within which reciprocal equality operates. Inamura does not try to 
articulate those theories as part of an attempt to study the structure of a market economy 
(as economists, classic or Marxist, tend to do), defending rather that they belong to 
Aristotle’s moral and political thought. The criticism of retail trade in Pol. I. 9, for 
instance, is based on its inadequacy, as a profit-making activity, for simply providing the 
necessary livelihood of a household or a polis. By the same token, the explanation of 
commutative justice, as exposed in NE 5. 5, is not a theory on the principles of price-
setting of products in a market economy (for example, the relationship between the 
demand for and the supply of the product). It is rather an attempt to describe how giving 
and repayment between citizens ought to be if they intend to maintain their relationship.  
Therefore, Aristotle does not develop a scientific account of exchanges but takes 
exchanges as an example of reciprocal human relationship. Just like the civic virtue 
developed in the alternate exercise of political authority, and the civic friendship 
flourishing through shared interests, commercial exchanges aim at that common benefit 
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the advancement of which keeps citizens associated. In this way, the author reaches a 
clear distinction between the reciprocal equality characteristic of commutative justice and 
the equality existing in corrective and distributive justice. While reciprocal equality gives 
rise to and maintains the voluntary relations of commutative justice, corrective justice 
intervenes only if someone refuses to fulfill the agreement. While distributive justice is 
concerned with the allocation of political office to those who meet the requirements for 
its exercise, reciprocal equality is concerned with the way they exercise political office, 
namely with regard to the benefit of other citizens. 
The same concern with civic bond animates, for Inamura, Aristotle’s remarks on 
the distribution of property: instead of carrying out the demagogic policy of distributing 
the lands and the money of the wealthy to the poor, the philosopher defends the 
distribution of extra resources in order to help the poor to acquire land property or to start 
business. Such a policy would attenuate the gap between wealthy and poor, avoiding 
thereby political problems like the loss of civic friendship, faction, etc. In sum, equality 
of property is by no means a major aim of politics, but alleviating economic disparities is 
important for favoring the reciprocal equality that keeps citizens united through civic 
activities and friendship.  
At the end of the book, in summarizing the several aspects of the political thought 
of Aristotle hitherto exposed, the author contends that the two guiding notions of 
reciprocal equality and aristocratic mixed constitution make it possible for us to realize 
imperfections in contemporary democratic theories. Their excessive focus on popular rule 
is particularly emphasized (insights number 1 and 3, p. 219-21). The liberal brand, 
fearing populism (and oblivious to the fact that modern democracies are actually mixed 
constitutions comprising aristocratic, oligarchic and monarchic elements), narrows its 
focus to the respect for human rights. It thus neglects the inherent tendency of modern 
democracies to degenerate into oligarchic or monarchic government. The defenders of 
popular sovereignty, on the other hand, ignoring the role of reciprocity in the 
development of civic virtues and civic friendship, adopt what Inamura calls “the ideology 
of ‘no-rule’” – they conceive democracy as simple majority rule and lose thereby sight of 
the ethical and political perspective that makes the democratic system workable.    
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3. Inamura on contemporary ‘Aristotelians’ 
 
The second point of the book, the opposition between Aristotle’s integral thought 
and the supposed selective Aristotelianism of some contemporary thinkers, seems to me 
less fortunate than the historical analysis of Aristotle’s work. I call it second because it 
really is minor in importance when compared to that historical analysis: even though 
Inamura opens the book with a long sub-chapter putting Aristotle and the modern 
thinkers side by side, the work undoubtedly privileges the examination of the political 
philosophy developed by the ancient thinker; the so-called modern Aristotelians being the 
object of sporadic comparisons to the original.  
Of course, this way of organizing the content of the book can be explained by the 
author’s understanding that the contemporary thinkers are selective in resorting to 
Aristotle. The partial interest of these thinkers would, thus, justify a procedure of 
punctuating about them when the content of their works somehow approaches the 
thought of the great classic. However, the criticism Inamura addresses to those 
contemporary authors, i.e., that “they do not fully illuminate his interesting view of 
politics” (p. 25), seems to me pointless, for the works of Hannah Arendt, Martha 
Nussbaum and Alasdair Macintyre - my remarks will concentrate on these - do not aim at 
fully illuminating Aristotle’s view of politics. Such an objective characterizes works 
belonging to the secondary literature dedicated to Aristotle, like Inamura’s own book and 
much of the work done in the departments of classical studies around the world. But the 
capabilities approach, for instance, is an original political theory that Nussbaum justifies 
on the basis of a eudemonic conception of ethics; in this context, resorting to Aristotle 
will be inevitably restricted to shared commitments, points of divergence being either set 
aside or criticized. By the same token, Macintyre relates his own work to Aristotle 
considered as the initiator of a tradition2, that is, of a sustained theoretical development 
that must go beyond the aims of its originators. Sometimes he even affirms that “I will be 
turning Aristotle against Aristotle”3, and that opens the way for his development of 
eudemonism towards human relations involving vulnerable people.  
2 See in particular chapter 12 of Macintyre (1984).  
3 Macintyre, 1999, p. 8. 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.11, n.2. p. 158-172, 2016. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v11i2p158-172 
168
As a matter of fact, Inamura’s contention that Aristotle’s thought, in its original 
formulation, provides more useful insights about our political problems than some 
modern authors, remains quite obscure throughout the book. One such example of 
obscurity is the comparison of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach with the concern with 
poverty and demagoguery in the Politics. In the beginning of chapter 6 we read about the 
incompatibility between the social-democratic policies (like land division and 
institutional support for families) aiming at the universal development of human 
functional capabilities in Nussbaum’s good society, on the one hand, and Aristotle’s lack 
of esteem for the poor as political agents, on the other. In the last sub-chapter (6. 5), 
however, where Inamura resorts to the text of 1320a29-b1 in order to explain Aristotle’s 
position against demagogic policies, we see that Aristotle is actually concerned with 
poverty to the extent that it endangers civic stability and friendship; avoiding those 
dangers requires policies that attenuate poverty, like helping the poor citizens to acquire 
land property or to start their own businesses. If I understand this passage, it seems that, 
even though one cannot simply affirm that Aristotle was a social-democrat, one can 
legitimately see in this passage a justification for social-democratic policies like those 
defended in the capabilities approach4.  
Inamura is right in pointing out that Aristotle’s concern with poverty is not a 
matter of distributive justice. That is, he was not a socialist avant la lettre. Poverty is a 
problem for Aristotle primarily because it endangers civic friendship, perverts the 
constitution towards extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy, and thus opens the way 
for tyranny. One could say, however, that Pol. VI contains a set of advices for preserving 
oligarchic and democratic regimes, so that the strictly civic justification for the policies of 
distribution we find there ought not to be taken as Aristotle’s whole view on the matter. 
4 The commentary to the same passage of the Politics by Newman, for instance, puts Aristotle 
proposal as concerned both with the civic institutions and with the economic conditions of 
citizens: “Aristotle’s advice is – use all the surplus revenue in giving the poorer citizens either 
simultaneously or by successive sections a start in farming or trade, relieve the rich of all useless 
liturgies, and make them contribute pay for such meetings of the assembly and dicasteries as are 
absolutely necessary. The result of this will be that the pauper demos living by attendance at 
frequent meetings of the assembly and dicasteries will be replaced by a better-to-do demos 
occupied in farming and trade, and therefore content with a few meetings of the assembly and 
dicasteries. It is when the assembly meets frequently that it claims all authority for itself and 
exalts itself above the magistrates and above the law” (Newman, 1902, p. 533-4).     
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Actually, the conception that a polis where citizens tend to belong to the middle class (as 
a result of social policies) provides better opportunity for their eudemonic development, 
seems to be consistent with Aristotle’s ethics. After all, he derides the poor precisely 
because they are unable to achieve a happy life (see EE 1215a25-b1). But even if we stick 
to the explicit justification for social policies in the Politics, the affirmation of Aristotle’s 
superiority remains unsubstantiated: we are faced with two different sets of reasons for 
the distribution of resources, the Aristotelian and the social-democratic, but the author 
does not explain why one is better than the other.    
Another doubtful instance of the superiority of Aristotle’s insights for our 
understanding of a democratic society is the last of the four insights appearing in the 
conclusion of the book (p. 219-22). Recognizing the difficulty in applying to the modern 
democratic state the theory of political participation we find in the Politics, the author 
affirms that this theory sheds light rather on the relevance of the civic participation in 
local communities. This is of course true, but I do not see why Aristotle’s treatment of 
this subject is necessarily more useful for us than that of some modern theorists. Such a 
judgment could be challenged in two respects. First, Aristotle does not recognize any 
human association that is larger than the polis, so that his treatment of local politics does 
not (and cannot) explain how it is part of the larger horizon of the politics in a Federation 
or Nation-State. Hannah Arendt provides precisely one such explanation in her On 
Revolution, especially in its last chapter, where the local communities are examined 
against the background of the whole edifice of the American Federation (to the extent 
that this edifice encompasses the representative institutions, local and federal, as well as 
the judicial authority, the populism Inamura ascribes to the conception of democracy of 
contemporary Aristotelians – insight 1 (p. 219) - certainly does not hold of Arendt).  
Second, the author is not entirely clear as to which local communities existing in 
modern states does Aristotle’s theories shed light on. The local community that is the 
object of study by Aristotle, the ancient polis, no longer exists and does not clearly 
correspond either to the modern State (much larger and powerful than the Greek poleis) 
or to modern cities (far less independent than the Greek poleis). Inamura refers to the 
integration of people into deliberative and judicial process on the local level, and that 
rightly suggests the jury system operating in many different places as an institution of 
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self-governance on which Aristotle’s theories can shed good light on. Still, by simply 
affirming the superiority of Aristotle in regard to his modern followers, the author seems 
oblivious of a relevant role displayed by those thinkers: examining forms of human 
associations to which Aristotle payed few or no attention at all.  
Macintyre, for instance, in his Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings 
Need the Virtues (a work Inamura does no cite), emphasizes local associations like 
fishing or mining communities (p.142-6), where he believes that virtues related to human 
vulnerability flourish in relations involving dependent and independent people. 
Dependent people, for example a disabled person or someone whose face is severely 
disfigured, gain the opportunity to interact with the independent agents and show them 
their distinctive qualities that otherwise would escape notice. Independent agents, in their 
turn, can improve their own practical reason by correcting the mistaken belief that they 
had nothing to learn from the disabled ones. This kind of relationship is of course not 
civic, like civic friendship; it seems closer to the relations existing between members of 
the “village” (kome), about which Aristotle unfortunately speaks with great brevity.    
Therefore, rather than the attempt to illuminate all aspects of Aristotle’s thought, 
modern Aristotelians seem to be concerned with exploring aspects of political reality that 
either were neglected by Aristotle or simply did not exist in his own lifetime. A 
substantive evaluation of their achievements would require the thorough examination of 
their work as a whole – for instance, Macintyre’s conception of the tradition of classic 
moral and political philosophy as being vaster and richer than Aristotle’s own 
contribution to it, important as this contribution is; or yet the defense of the classical 
political experience by Hannah Arendt against the whole tradition of political philosophy, 
including the classical philosophers. And that is precisely what we do not find in the 
present book: the examination of the so-called modern Aristotelians does not develop into 
a comprehensive study of equal importance when compared to the study dedicated to the 
work of Aristotle.  
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